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CORPS OF ENGINEERS DREDGE AND FILL
JURISDICTION: BUTTRESSING A CITADEL UNDER SIEGE
W. Ci nms

HoYER*

The Nation's coastal and estuarine wetlands are vital to the survival

of a wide variety of fish and wildlife; they have an important function
in controllingfloods and tidal forces; and they contain some of the most
beautiful areas left on this continent. These same lands, however, are
often some of the most sought-after for development. As a consequence,
wetland acreage has been declining as more and more areas are drained
and filled for residential,commercial, and industrialprojects.,
All our nation's shorelines and waters are facing actual or impending pollution or development.2 Uncontrolled, unplanned, and piecemeal dredging
and filling of such areas for industrial and residential development can and
has resulted in gradual depletion of our aquatic resources.3 Unspoiled beach
and shore areas available for public use are becoming scarce.4 Adjacent waters
and wetlands are being degraded, destroying their value as feeding, nesting,
and spawning areas for waterfowl, fish, shellfish, and other dependent wildlife.5 Unless the need for development is carefully weighed and effectively
*B.S. 1970, Rider College (Trenton); J.D. 1973, University of Florida; Member, The

Florida Bar.
1. President Nixon's "Environmental Protection" message, submitted to Congress Feb. 8,
1972. H.R. Doc. No. 247, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972).
2.

HOUSE CoMIf. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, INCREASING PROTEMON FOR OUR WATERS,

REP. No. 1323, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.
2 (1972) [hereinafter cited as INCREASING PROTECTION FOR OuR WATERS]. Our country's marine
environment involves 33,000 miles of shore and river line and 109,000 square miles of water.
Porro, Invisible Boundary -Private and Sovereign Marshland Interests, 3 NATURAL REsouRcEs
LAw 512, 513 (1970).
3. Heath, Estuarine Conservation Legislation in the States, 5 LAND & WATER L. REv. 351,
352-58 (1970). Marshland near metropolitan areas has become some of the most valuable real
WETLANDS AND SHORELINES: THE CORPs OF ENGINEERS, H.R.

estate in the world. FORTUNE, Sept. 1969, at 50.

4. As of 1965 Florida had already lost nearly 1001 of its shoreline to small dredge and
fill operations. California had already suffered a 67% loss. Hearings on Permit for Landfill in Hunting Creek, Va. Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and Natural Resources of
the House Comm. on Government Operations, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 56 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Hunting Creek Hearings].
5. The coastal zone is biologically the most productive of all land or water areas on
earth. Seven of the ten most valuable of the species in American commercial fisheries spend
all or important periods of their lives in estuarine waters. At least eighty other commercially
important fish species are dependent on estuaries. Ludwigson, Managing the Environment in
the Coastal Zone, 1 ENVIRONMtENT REPt. -CURRENT DEvELOPMENTs, Monograph No. 3, 1-2
(1970). As of 1965 the United States had lost over 7% (about 750,000 acres) of its total
estuarine areas to small dredge and fill operations. Hunting Creek Hearings,supra note 4, at
56. Over one-third of the estuarine area of Boca Ciega Bay and Tampa Bay had been filled
five years ago. A study of the area by the Bureau of Commercial Fisheries revealed that
areas around previously filled and dredged zones were biological deserts even after ten years.
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries and Wildlife Conservation of the House Comm.
on Merchant Marineand Fisheries,90th Cong., 1st Sess. 40 (1968).
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controlled, most of our prime shores will be irretrievably altered by the year
2000.6

The United States Army Corps of Engineers 7 has the major statutory responsibility for most of these waterways, shorelands, and wetlands.8 Work in
the waterways over which the Corps has jurisdiction is subject to Corps approval.9 Since recent history has witnessed an accelerating expansion of the
Corps of Engineers jurisdiction, the Corps has been thrust into a role requiring significant environmental responsibility.10 Being a developer itself,- the
Corps has not traditionally been oriented toward resource conservation and
is not presently administratively equipped to evaluate ecological factors in
coastal dredging projects fairly.'2 Caught in the conflict between traditional
functions and broadening environmental responsibility, the Corps is being
impaled by environmentalists for its lack of aggressiveness while, 3 at the
same time, being criticised by developers for lack of clarity, consistency, and
timeliness in defining the boundaries of its regulatory authority.
This article will examine the basis for Corps of Engineers jurisdiction over
dredge and fill projects and will trace the expansion of that jurisdiction into
the environmental arena. By examining the legal basis and history of this
expansion we can more readily project and evaluate the role of the Corps in
the future and formulate workable recommendations to protect the coastal
environment adequately.
BASIS OF CORPS JURISDICTION

Our form of government necessitates federal control over navigable
waters. 14 Although the Constitution does not mention navigable waters, it

6. INCREASING PROTECTION FOR OUR WATERS, supra note 2, at 2. Besides the obvious aesthetic
loss, Florida suffers a resource loss of $600 per year for each acre of dredged submerged land.
51 ENVIRONMENT REP. - FED. LAWS 4201 (1970).
7. The civil functions of the Department of the Army are carried out by the Corps of
Engineers. 33 C.F.R. §209.120(a)(2) (1972).
8. See 33 U.S.C. §§401-65 (1970); 33 C.F.R. §209.120(a)(1) (1972).
9. 33 C.F.R. §209.120 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
See also Comment, Protection of the Environment and the Army Corps of Engineers: The
Extent of Responsibility, 1971 LAw & Soc. ORDER 778.
11. The Corps is empowered by Congress to construct federal water development projects. Up to $25 million may be expended yearly on both "small" navigation projects and
flood control development wthout special authorization. 33 US.C. §577(a) (1970) (navigation);
id. §701(s) (flood control).
12. See Note, Corps of Engineers- New Guardians of Ecology, 31 LA. L. REv. 666, 679
(1971). See also Liroff, Administrative, Judicial and Natural Systems: Agency Response to the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 3 LOYOLA U.L.J. (Chicago) 19, 29-30 (1972).
13. "The Army Corps of Engineers is public enemy number one." Justice William 0.
Douglas as quoted in SATURDAY REV., May 1, 1971, at 4. See also ATLANTIC, April 1970, at 51;
FIELD & STREAM, Oct. 1970, at 58; NATION, FEB. 14, 1966, at 180; PLAYBOY, July 1969, at 143.
14. It has always been assumed that the sovereign external powers passed corporately and
not to the colonies individually. See Penhallow v. Doan, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 53 (1795); Trelease,
Arizona v. California: Allocation of Water Resources to People, States, and Nation, 1963 Sup.
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vests in Congress the power to "regulate commerce with foreign nations and
among the several states."15 In Gibbons v. Ogden16 it was held that the power
to regulate commerce necessarily included the power to regulate navigation. To
make this control effective Congress was deemed empowered to keep navigable
waters open and free and to provide sanctions for interference.The regulatory power of the Corps of Engineers over dredge and fill projects is based on section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,18 which
makes it illegal to fill, excavate, alter, or modify the course, condition, or
capacity of waters within the boundaries of a navigable waterway without
authorization from the Corps of Engineers. Because the Act limits the Corps'
authority to the set boundaries of navigable waters, the scope of the Corps'
physical jurisdiction hinges on how many waterways are deemed navigable
and the manner in which the boundaries of these waters are determined.
EXPANDING CORPS JURISDICTION BY BROADENING THE

DEFINImON OF NAVIGABILITY

At common law, all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tides were
deemed navigable. 19 Early in our nation's history this approach, adequate for
a country surrounded by tidal waters, such as England, was rejected as too
restrictive.20 Seeing a definition of navigability appropriate to a vast country

Cr. RLv. 158, 176-82. The states still have some jurisdiction over navigable waters. Martin
v. Waddell, 41 US. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842). See United States v. California, 381 U.S. 139 (1965),
for a delineation of the scope of state control.
15. U.S. CONsT. art. I, §3.
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). See also Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1877): Veazie v.
Moore, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 567 (1852); Norris v. City of Boston, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282 (1849).
17. See, e.g., Gilman v. Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865). Congress has power
to regulate commerce in navigable waters if the activity to be controlled has a substantial
economic effect on interstate commerce. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). This
power applies to private riparian submerged land in navigable waters. United States v. Rands,
389 US. 121, 127 (1967). See 43 U.S.C. §1314(a) (1970).
18. "The creation of any obstruction not affirmatively authorized by Congress, to the
navigable capacity of any of the waters of the United States is prohibited ... and it shall
not be lawful to excavate or fill, or in any manner to alter or modify the course, location,
condition, or capacity of, any port . . . or of the channel of any navigable water of the
United States, unless the work has been recommended by the Chief of Engineers and authorized by the Secretary of the Army prior to beginning the same." 33 U.S.C. §403 (1970). The
Supreme Court upheld the validity of the Act's delegation of congressional power to the
Secretary and Chief of Engineers in Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 413-14 (1929). For
routine permit applications that are unopposed, the Secretary of the Army has delegated his
authority to authorize permits to the Chief of Engineers, 33 C.F.R. §209.120(c)(1)(i) (1972),
who in turn has delegated his authority to Division and District Engineers. Id. §209.
120(c)(1)('ii).
19. See, e.g., Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847); Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 175 (1837); The Thomas Jefferson, 23 US. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825).
20. The Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 456-57 (1851). It is uncertain
whether the "ebb and flow" criterion was replaced by later tests or just incorporated within
these broader definitions. Some courts recently have upheld Corps jurisdiction in areas
affected by the ebb and flow of an adjacent navigable waterway. Tatum v. Blackstock, 319
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with an abundance of inland lakes and rivers, the Supreme Court in 1870
adopted a "navigability-in-fact"
22
navigable when:

test. 2' Under this test waters were deemed

[T]hey form in their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting
with other waters, a continued highway over which commerce is or may
be carried on with other States or foreign countries in the customary
modes in which such commerce is conducted by water.
This basic definition was enlarged in 1874 to include the capability or po23
tential of public use, rather than merely the extent of actual use.
The breadth of the federal test was again expanded in 1921 when the
Supreme Court formulated the "indelible navigability" rule in Economy
Light & Power Co. v. United States.24 Under this rule a waterbody's past history or commercial use made it navigable, despite subsequent physical or
economic changes preventing present use for commercial purposes. 25 Thereafter, waterways were held navigable for the purpose of federal jurisdiction if
in their ordinary condition they were, could be, or had ever in the past been
26
used as part of a highway for interstate or foreign commerce.
The onset of massive federal programs in the 1930's involving flood control, hydroelectric, and reclamation projects demanded an even broader basis
for federal regulatory control. Thus, the Supreme Court in United States v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co.,27 after affirming that navigability should remain a question of fact, expanded the scope of "navigable waters" to include
those that could be made navigable through "reasonable improvements," even
though such improvements had not been completed or even authorized.28 "The
power of Congress over Commerce is not to be hampered because of the neces-

F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1963); United States v. Baker, 2 E.R.C. 1849 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). But see The
Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870) (the ebb and flow of the tide does not constitute "any test at all of the navigability of waters"); Pitship Duck Club v. Town of Sequin,
315 F. Supp. 309 (W.D. Wash. 1970) (federal jurisdiction over lagoon denied because ebb
and flow is not a federal test of navigability).
21. The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870).
22. Id. at 563.
23. The Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441-42 (1874).
24. 256 U.S. 113 (1921).
25. Id. at 123.
26. The floating of a log, if related in some way to interstate commerce, will make a
stream navigable under the federal test. See, e.g., St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. St.
Paul Water Comm'rs, 168 U.S. 349 (1897) (upper stretch of Mississippi River deemed
navigable even though only logs could traverse some sections); Wisconsin v. FPC, 214 F.2d
334 (7th Cir. 1954) (although never used for ordinary boat traffic the river was deemed
navigable under the federal test because of log drives occurring on it from 1876-1924).
Logging activities are not always sufficient for federal navigability determination if no relation exists to interstate commerce. Willow River Power Co. v. United States, 324 U.S. 499
(1945); Northern New Hampshire Lumber Co. v. New Hampshire Water Resources Bd., 56
F. Supp. 177 (D.N.H. 1944).
27. 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
28. Id. at 408.
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sity for reasonable improvements to make an interstate waterway available
for traffic." 29 After Appalachian, waters obstructed by falls, rapids, sandbars,
rock mounds, and debris were not precluded from the grasp of federal jurisdiction.30
Appalachian's broad expansion of the definition of "navigable waters" allows all but the most insignificant waterbodies to be deemed navigable. Factual
analysis is thus difficult, if not impossible. The present federal test may have
become a standard without exception and, therefore, one with little meaning.
Realistically, "navigability" is now no more than a base that federal courts
feel obligated to touch when clearing the path for the progress of federal
policies or programs. 3 1
EXPANDING CORPS JURISDICrION BY WIDENING THE
RECOGNIZED BOUNDARIES OF NAvIGABLE WATERS

Assuming a body of water is declared "navigable" under the federal test,
and therefore subject to Corps of Engineers jurisdiction, one must then determine where such jurisdiction terminates -that is, the boundaries of the
waterway. The Corps of Engineers traditionally utilized both naturally and
artificially created boundary lines to limit its physical jurisdiction. For example, the Corps has relied upon both the naturally created high water line
and the artificially created "harbor lines" to restrict its regulatory authority.
Recognizing that the logical point to separate land from water is the high
water mark, most statutes and cases utilize this line in some form 32 - generally
to separate public ownership and use of the water and submerged land from
private use and ownership of upland.33 In tidal areas, the Supreme Court has
deemed the high tide line the standard for fixing the boundaries of tidelands. 34
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., Puente de Reynosa, SA. v. City of McAllen, 357 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1966);
Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp. v. FPC, 344 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1965); Namekagon Hydro Co. v.
FPC, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954); Wisconsin v. FPC, 214 F.2d 334 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
348 U.S. 883 (1954); Wisconsin Pub. Serv. Corp. v. FPC, 147 F.2d 743 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
325 U.S. 880 (1945).
31. Leighty, The Source and Scope of Public and Private Rights in Navigable Waters,
5 LAm & WATER L. REV. 391, 436 (1970). See §502(7) of the recently amended Federal Water
Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1151-60 (1970), which defines "navigable waters" as "the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." The Corps regulations adopted in
1973 define "navigable waters" as "those waters which are presently, or have been in the
past, or may be in the future susceptible for use for purposes of interstate commerce. A
determination of navigability, once made, applies laterally over the entire surface of the
water body, and is not extinguished by later actions or events which impede or destroy
navigable capacity." 37 Fed. Reg. 18,290 (1972).
32. See F. MALONEY, S. PLAGER & F. BALDWIN, WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: THE
FLORIDA EXPERIENCE 67 (1968); Porro, supra note 2, at 518.
33. Gay, The High Water Mark: Boundary Between Publicand Private Lands, 18 U. FLA.
L. REy. 553 (1966).
34. Borax Consol., Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 26-27 (1935). See also Shively
v. Bowlby, 152 US. 1 (1894); United States v. Pacheco, 69 US. (2 Wall.) 587 (1864); Humble

Oil & Ref. Co. v. Sun Oil Co., 190 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 920 (1952).
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Therefore, until recently the Corps accepted this line as the absolute limit of
its physical jurisdiction and required no permits even for massive dredging and
filling above this line. The legal basis for this restriction, however, has been
eroding. Courts are gradually realizing that work done above the mean high
water line may violate the Rivers and Harbors Act if the activity can directly
"alter or modify" the course or condition of a body of water. Thus, the dredging or filling itself may be outside the apparent limits of federal regulatory
control, but if the effects of the work on navigable waters can be shown the
Corps of Engineers would have legal justification for extending its physical
jurisdiction to abate the violation. 35
Historically, the Corps also limited its jurisdiction through establishment
of "harbor lines.' ' 36 The purpose of these lines, authorized under section 11 of
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, 37 is to separate and protect navigable
channels and harbor areas from water areas not essential to navigation.38 Once
such lines were established, Corps policy did not require the issuance of a
dredge and fill permit for work shoreward of a harbor line. Only if the proposed work was within the channel or area protected by harbor lines was a
permit deemed necessary. 39 Until recently, Corps regulations explicitly stated
that the establishment of a harbor line "implies consent to riparian owners to
erect structures to the line without special authorization." 40 Whatever merit
harbor lines may have had for protecting navigation, Corps policy concerning
them resulted in large unprotected areas shoreward of submerged lands. House
Committee hearings, for example, disclosed that unprotected lands in San
41
Francisco Bay exceeded nineteen square miles.

35. See, e.g., United States v. Baker, 2 E.R.C. 1849 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (filling of marshland
enjoined for affecting the navigable waters of the United States). See also United States v.
President of Jamaica & R. Turnpike Rd., 183 F.2d 598 (E.D.N.Y. 1910). The Corps regulations
adopted in 1973 still do not recognize jurisdiction shoreward of the mean high tide line. See
37 Fed. Reg. 18,291 (1972).
36. Also called "pierhead lines and bulkhead lines." 33 C.F.R. §209.150 (1972). See Clary,
Water Quality Control Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 5 NATURAL RESOURCES LAw. 224,
226-27 (1972).
37. 33 U.S.C. §404 (1970) (Secretary of the Army may establish harbor lines whenever
he deems them "essential to the preservation and protection of harbors").
38. The apparent rationale for the Corps' acceptance of harbor lines, and the mean high

water mark, as geographical limits upon its jurisdiction was its view, buttressed by existing
case law, that its regulatory function under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899 involved
only the protection of navigation. See text accompanying notes 47-54 infra.
39. 33 C.F.R. §209.150(b) (1970). See Montgomery v. Portland, 190 U.S. 89 (1903); 27
Op. ATr'Y

GEN. 432, 434-36 (1909).
40. 33 C.F.R. §209.150(i)(1) (1970). However, the Corps regulations stated that harbor
lines did not imply consent to every kind of operation landward of the lines and mentioned
dredging as an example of operations that will "ordinarily require the authorization of the
Department to insure that operations are conducted under proper restrictions." Id. The
district engineers were to "keep informed" of operations landward of the lines. Id. §209.150(i)(2).
41. HousE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, OUR WATERS AND WETLANDS: How THE
CORPS

OF ENGINEERS CAN HELP PREVENT THEIt DESnRUCrION AND POLLUTION,

917, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as OUR WATERS
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Responding to criticism of this policy,4 2 the Corps recently broadened its
physical jurisdiction by revising harbor line regulations. After conceding that
under the previous policy "there was the danger that work shoreward of existing harbor lines could be undertaken without appropriate consideration having been given to the impact ... on the environment," 43 Corps regulations
now state that "all existing and future harbor lines are declared to be guidelines" only and that permits will be required "for any work which is commenced shoreward of existing or future harbor lines" 4 after the effective date
of May 27, 1970. Significantly, the Corps also broadened its responsibility to
the public. Previously, public hearings on harbor line decisions were kept to
a minimum and were "the exception rather than the rule." 45 Under new regulations, however, public hearings will be held whenever there is sufficient
public interest or when federal, state, or local officials request a hearing.46
EXPANDING THE CORPS OF ENGINEERS SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Expansion of the definition and boundaries of navigable waters considerably broadened the geographical reach of Corps' regulatory authority. And although bringing more areas within the Corps jurisdictional ambit was, in itself, significant, the importance was substantially increased by a recent broadening of subject matter jurisdiction. The Corps, for years concerned solely with
protecting the navigable capacity of waters, would ultimately be responsible
for guarding the ecology of all areas under its control.
When passing the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, Congress was primarily
concerned with protecting navigation. 47 Although the Act does not expressly
limit the grounds for denying a permit to navigational interferences, the Corps
traditionally administered the Act with primary emphasis on the effects on
navigation. 48 It seemingly believed that incidental injuries not directly related
"to the navigable capacity of the waters or their use" in interstate commerce
49
should not be considered.
42. The criticism had a legal basis. The passage of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination
Act (F. & W.C.A.), 16 U.S.C. §§661 et seq. (1970), made the legality of ignoring shoreward
areas questionable. The F. & W.CA. requires the Corps to review and consult with federal
or state agencies having jurisdiction over wildlife resources "whenever the waters of any ...
body of water . .. to be impounded, diverted ... or . .. modified for any purpose whatever" and makes no exception for areas shoreward of harbor lines. Id. §662(a).
43. 33 C.F.R. §209.150(b)(1) (1972).
44. Id. §209.150(b)(2). No permit would be required for work commenced before May 27,
1970. Id.
45. 33 C.F.P. §209.150(e) (1968).

46. 33 C.F.R. §209.150(c) (1972).
47. 32 Cong. Rec. 2297 (1899). See H.R. REP. No. 794, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 4 (1924) (the
use of the words "impeded" or "obstructed" imply a physical hindrance to navigation that
does not occur in oil spills. See also United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 229 n.6
(1966); S.REP. No. 66, 68th Cong., Ist Sess. 2, 3 (1924).
48. The Supreme Court originally limited the Government's control over navigable
waters to navigational purposes. See Weber v. Board of Harbor Conm'rs, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
57 (1873).
49. 27 Op. Arr'y GEN. 285, 288 (1909). See also 34 Op.Aftr', GEN. 410, 412, 415.16 (1926).
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This interpretation of Corps jurisdiction had solid case support.50 An activity would be deemed illegal only if it could be interpreted as obstructing
navigation. Sanitary District v. United States5' typifies the approach employed.
There, a diversion of water from Lake Michigan was held to violate section 10
of the Rivers and Harbors Act because "it concerns a change in the condition
of the Lakes and the Chicago River, admitted to be navigable, and, if that be
...
52 In Miami Beach
necessary, an obstruction to their navigable capacity.
Jockey Club, Inc. v. Dern5 3 a permit decision was ordered to be based "exclusively on evidence directed to the question whether, in light of present-day
conditions with relation to commerce and navigation [the project] will ob54
...
struct the navigable capacity of the waterway.
jurisdiction was broadened
Corps'
subject
matter
The potential scope of the
with the 1970 passage of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act,55 establishing
a national policy of wildlife conservation. Section 2(a) requires all public and
private agencies whose projects come within Corps jurisdiction to consult with
the Fish and Wildlife Service to determine the project's effect on wildlife resources. 56 The Act provides further that "wildlife conservation shall receive
equal consideration .. .with other features of water resource development
programs. ... "57
Although this Act seemed to mandate Corps consultations with the Fish
and Wildlife Service and considerations of the effects on wildlife before the
granting of dredge and fill permits, no affirmative action was taken by the
Department of the Army for nine years. In 1967 under Congressional pressure,
the Secretary of the Army signed a "Memorandum of Understanding" with
the Secretary of the Interior~5 The Memorandum pledged cooperation between the agencies and bound the Corps to consult with the Department of
the Interior concerning potential effects of a project on wildlife preservation.5 9
Following the Memorandum of Understanding, Corps regulations governing permit applications were revised. Thereafter, when the Corps was con-

50. See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); Wisconsin v. Illinois,
278 U.S. 367 (1929); United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411 (1926);
Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405 (1925); Blake v. United States, 295 F.2d 91 (4th
Cir. 1961); Miami Beach Jockey Club v. Dern, 86 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 299

U.S. 566 (1936).
51. 266 U.S. 405 (1925).
52. Id. at 429. See also Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 414 (1929).
53. 86 F.2d 135 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 556 (1936).
54. Id. at 136. The unwillingness to examine Corps authority outside of navigational
concerns has persisted until quite recently. See, e.g., Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States,
389 U.S. 191 (1967); United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States
v. Ray, 423 F.2d 16 (5th Cir. 1970); Blake v. United States, 295 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1961);
Chambers-Liberty Counties Navigation Dist. v. Parker Bros. & Co., 263 F. Supp. 602 (S.D.
Tex. 1967).
55. 16 U.S.C. §661 (1970).
56. Id. §662(a).
57. Id. §661.
58. 33 C.F.R. §209.120(d)(11) (1970).
59. Id.
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fronted with a dredge or fill permit application it pledged to consider "all
relevant factors, including the effect of the proposed work on navigation, fish
and wildlife, conservation, pollution, aesthetics, ecology, and the general public
interest."60

When the Corps of Engineers applied this new policy of considering
ecological effects, it immediately came into conflict with existing case law that
limited the Corps to appraising only the effects of a project upon navigation.
This conflict between new policy and settled precedent culminated in the landmark decision of Zabel v. Tabb.61
In Zabel two landowners sought a Corps permit to dredge and fill eleven
acres of submerged land in Boca Ciega Bay, Florida. The Corps held a public

hearing where opposition to the project was expressed.62 A permit was subsequently denied by the district engineer as being contrary to the public in-

terest.03 Concurring in the denial, the Secretary of the Army noted that the
proposed work would have an adverse effect on the Bay's ecology.6 4
The permit applicants then sought judicial review, the sole issue being the
authority of the Corps to deny a permit on purely environmental grounds.65
The district court, following well-settled precedent, held that the Rivers and

Harbors Act did not "vest the Secretary of the Army with discretionary authority" to deny dredge and fill permits where he found no interference with
navigation. 6 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and held that Congress had broad powers under the commerce clause to regulate matters with

an impact on interstate commerce, including matters relating to environmental

60. Id. §209.120(d). This regulation revised an earlier version dated Dec. 7, 1967, which
read: "The decision as to whether a permit will be issued will be predicated upon the effects
of the permitted activities on the public interest including effects upon water quality, recreation, fish and wildlife, pollution, our natural resources, as well as the effects on navigation:'
33 C.F.R. §209.330(a) (1968).
61. 296 F. Supp. 764 (M.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,

401 U.S. 910 (1971).
62. Id. at 766. It is Corps policy to refuse issuance of a permit when state or local
authorities oppose the work. 33 C.F.R. §209.120(d)(1) (1972). The courts have interpreted
Corps power under the Rivers and Harbors Act as preventive, not permissive, and have recognized the states' authority to regulate navigable waters and submerged lands under the
shadow of Congress' paramount commerce power. Montgomery v. Portland, 190 U.S. 89
(1903) (state may establish more restrictive harbor lines than those of Corps); Cummings v.
Chicago, 188 U.S. 410 (1903) (federal permit holder must obtain state or local authorization
prior to building on submerged land). See also United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917);
Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); 22 Op. ATr'y GEN. 501 (1897).
63. 295 F. Supp. 764, 766 (M.D. Fla. 1969), rev'd, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971).
64. Id.
65. There was a perfect crystallization of issues. The Corps admitted the work would
have no substantial impact on navigation, denying permission solely on ecological grounds. Id.

at 767. The landowners conceded evidence as to environmental harm but alleged that permit
decisions must be based on navigational considerations. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 201 (5th
Cir. 1970).
66. 296 F. Supp. 764, 771 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
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stability and to fish and wildlife in estuarine zones. 67 Furthermore, the court
ruled that the Secretary of the Army, as the delegatee of Congress under section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act, could deny a permit on purely environmental grounds.68 The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act and the
newly-enacted National Environmental Policy Act 69 were viewed by the court
70
as mandating a consideration of environmental values by the Corps. Although the Zabel court's reasoning has been questioned7 1 and the decision
leaves many questions unanswered 7 2 Zabel clearly broadened the Corps' sub-

67. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 201 (5th Cir. 1970). The court rejected the contention
that Congress, by enacting the Submerged Lands Act of 1953, 43 U.S.C. §§1301-43 (1970),
had relinquished to the states its power to regulate tideland property except for purposes
of navigation, flood control, and hydroelectric power (these exceptions being expressly retained in §1311(d) of the Act). The court held that the retention of control over navigation,
flood control, and hydroelectric power was designed to eliminate potential federal-state conflicts and that, since §1314(a) of the Act reserves the Congress' commerce power, the federal
government retained authority under the Commerce Clause to prohibit a project on land
beneath navigable waters solely on environmental grounds. Zabel v. Tabb, supra at 205-06.
See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 127 (1967). See generally Lewis, A Capsule History
and the Present Status of the Tidelands Controversy, 3 NATURAL RESOURcES LAw. 620 (1970);
Stone, The Marine Enviroment- Recent Legal Developments, 3 NATURAL RrSoURCES LAW. 26
(1969).
68. 430 F.2d 199, 209 (5th Cir. 1970).
69. 42 U.S.C. §§4331-47 (1970). The Act requires every federal agency to consider
ecological factors when dealing with activities that may have an adverse impact on the environment. Id. §4332.
70. 430 F.2d 199, 209. Although the National Environmental Policy Act came into effect
after the district court's decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Secretary's
decision to deny the permit must be evaluated by currently applicable standards. Id. Cf.
Pennsylvania Environmental Council v. Bartlett, 315 F. Supp. 238, 248 (M.D. Pa. 1970)
(Secretary of Treasury not precluded from granting funds for road project that antedated
and violated National Environmental Policy Act because Act not retroactive). See also Sierra
Club v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 126-27 (D. Alas. 1971); Brooks v. Volpe, 319 F. Supp. 90
(M.D. Wash. 1970).
71. The court cited two cases as precedent that the Corps has authority to deny a permit
for non-navigational factors. In the first, United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S.
352 (1933), the Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of mandamus ordering the Secretary
to permit construction of a wharf, even though the decision to deny the permit was based
on the increased cost to the Government to condemn the property to build a parkway, and
not based on obstruction of navigation. Although the Zabel court cited Greathouse as
authority for the proposition that the Corps cannot "wear navigational blinders" when
considering an application for a permit, Greathouse failed to reach the question of the
scope of authority under §10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act to deny permits.
The second case was Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970), in which an injunction ordering the Corps not to
issue a dredge and fill permit to the state for construction of an expressway was affirmed.
There, however, the decision was based upon the state's failure to secure congressional and
Department of Transportation approval for construction of certain structures; and, furthermore, the holding was based primarily on §9, not §10, of the Rivers and Harbors Act.
72. Questions regarding the discretion allowable in weighing environmental factors still
remain. For example, are there times when the Corps would have to deny a permit purely
on environmental grounds? Are there other situations in which the Corps could grant a
permit in the public interest despite environmental harm?
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ject matter jurisdiction by charging it with clearly defined environmental responsibilities.73
Thus, Zabel recognizes the Corps' duty of examining dredge and fill permits
to determine the effect of the proposed project not only on the navigable
capacity of the waterway, but also on the general environment. This broad
environmental mandate was originally thought to encompass not only the
effects of the dredging or filling upon aquatic life and habitat, but also the
effects on general water quality. The passage of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA) 74 however, may have removed
a portion of the authority for evaluating water quality from the Corps. The
FWPCA deals primarily with controlling and regulating pollution. To accomplish its goals a permit program is established to oversee and regulate
discharges of pollution.- Before a permit will be granted, a certificate must
76
be issued by a state agency attesting to the project's effect on water quality.
Thus, if dredging and filing is deemed to be an activity "which may result in [a] discharge into the navigable waters" 77 a state certification as to
water quality must be obtained by the applicant and submitted to the Corps
prior to securing the Corps permit.78 Once such certification is obtained, the
determination as to water quality attested by the certificate will be conclusive
9
and cannot be overridden or altered by the Corps of Engineers7
THE CoRPs OF ENGINEERS AND THE FUTURE

- INADEQUACIES

REQUIRING REMEDY

Recent expansions of geographical and subject matter jurisdiction have,
unquestionably, better equipped the Corps to protect coastal areas from indiscriminate, haphazard, and uncontrolled development. Use and misuse of
this expanded jurisdiction, however, have subjected the Corps to increasingly
virulent attacks by both environmentalists and developers. Since the Corps of
Engineers has traditionally been involved with its own construction projects,
80
many believe it has not developed the requisite ecological orientation. In
fact, the Corps has been accused of summarily ignoring its ecological duty
except where a project application contains overwhelming proof of environ-

mental damage."' At worst the Corps is guilty of gross negligence by defaulting
73. See United States v. Moretti, 331 F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (defendant, whose
illegal fill damaged ecology, ordered to restore bay). See also United States v. Underwood, 344
F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
74. Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, §2, 86 Stat. 816.
75. Id., 86 Stat. 880.
76. Id., 86 Stat. 877.
77.
78.

Id.
Id.

79. Id.
80. See Liroff, Administrative, Judicial and Natural Systems: Agency Response to the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 3 LoYoLA U.L.J. (Chicago) 19, 29, 80 (1972);
Note, Corps of Engineers -New Guardians of Ecology, 31 LA. L. REv. 666, 679 (1971).
81. See, e.g., Farney, Meet a Prime Polluter- Uncle Sam, Wall Street Journal, Sept. 23,
1970, at 14, col. 4; PLAYBOY, July 1969, at 143.
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in its duty as guardian of water-related resources; at best it suffers from a crisis
of confidence. Whatever the character of its failing, it is nonetheless clear that
the people no longer believe the Corps will seriously protect their environ82

mental resources.

Thus, the concerns of environmentalists relate to two specific factors: first,
the competency of an agency itself engaged in development to review, objectively and adequately, the ecological consequences of similar projects undertaken by others; second, the adequacy of present Corps regulations to meet
its ecological responsibilities.
Some think the Corps of Engineers should get out of the civil works planning business altogether. Believing that the "dredging ethic" is now so ingrained in Corps policy that environmental needs will be given only token
consideration, these critics call for vesting the responsibility for preserving the
ecological balance of our nation's waters in a separate agency concerned solely
with the environment5 3 Only such a body, they contend, could receive the
needed insulation from internal pressure and neutrality from conflicting mis84
sions to do a proper job.
Absent complete abandonment of civil works planning, some sharing of
functions may be in order. Since the Corps is inexperienced (some say negligent) in balancing economic against environmental factors, it could be relieved of the responsibility of determining cost-benefit ratios on federal projects
5
or the environmental impact of private projects.

82. The lack of confidence stems from recognition that the Corps has developed strong
economic and social ties with the industry it is obligated to regulate. The Water Resources
Congress, for example, includes Congressmen, Army engineers and contractors among its
7,000 members. Affiliated with this organization are 50 state groups, water and land development associations, and local government agencies. Liroff, supra note 80, at 31. This is
hardly surprising considering the Corps was for years charged with a mandate of economic
development. Like any organization, the Corps developed a favorable balance of constituencies
and predictable relationships for its organizational self-preservation. Environmentalists were
insignificant within the framework. Liroff, supra note 80, at 27. See J. MARCH & H. SIMON,
ORGANIZATIONS 141 (1958); J. THOMPSON, ORGANIZATION IN ACTION 90 (1967). See also Holden,
"Imperialism" in Bureaucracy, 60 Am.POL. SC. REv. 943 (1966).
83. ATLANTIC, April 1970, at 62. Possibly for these same reasons the recently amended
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§1151-60 (1970), has divested the Corps of
its authority to issue discharge permits under the Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §407 (1970). The
permit program will be administered by the Environmental Protection Agency and ultimately
will be relegated to qualified state agencies.
84. Having a civil works mission, it is in the Corps' organizational self-interest to encourage and approve water related projects. Most Congressmen, especially in election years,
like such projects approved for their districts: the short-term economic benefits are considerable and employment provided for the construction trades is substantial. The Corps'
survival is thus more dependent on economic development than on environmental protection. Liroff, supra note 80, at 30. For a general discussion of agencies' inability to adjust
adequately to new problems, see D. KATZ & R. KAHN, TiE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS 225 (1966); J. MARCH & H. SIMON, supra note 82, at 225.
85. Water development projects are evaluated on the basis of their cost-benefit ratios;
the goal is to produce more than one dollar of gain for each dollar invested. See J. SAx,
WATER LAW, PLANNING AND POLICY 29-42 (1968). Critics of the Corps allege that this ratio is
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If, as seems likely, the Corps is to retain responsibility for both water resources development and environmental evaluation, changes in the underlying policy and implementation of Corps regulations are necessary. Present
regulations are insufficient in that they: (1) do not place the burden of proof
upon the permit applicant, (2) allow exceptions or "grandfather in" existing
violations, (3) do not provide adequate notice to the public concerning proposed projects, (4) do not require Corps decisions to be on the record of a
hearing, (5) take a restrictive view of Corps jurisdiction, and (6) do not provide aggressive and consistent enforcement procedures.
The Corps has traditionally placed the burden of proving adverse effects
upon the opponents of a dredge and fill permit application. Applications were
routinely approved unless the opposition showed clearly that substantial
damage to the public interest would result. 86 Although the Corps now prepares
and coordinates environmental impact statements under the National Environmental Policy Act,8 7 it continues to base its decisions primarily on information
and advice received from other governmental agencies and private individuals.
Thus, its regulations require very little from the applicant himself. Permit applications need only include "a letter requesting the permit, accompanied by
maps and plans of the proposed work.""" The applicant is required to demonstrate neither the ecological effect of his work nor the manner in which the
project would benefit the public interest.89
The Corps' practice of including "grandfather clauses" in its regulations
is also questionable. For example, when the Corps amended its regulations to
make permits necessary for construction shoreward of harbor lines,90 a clause
exempting work commenced before May 27, 1970, was incorporated.9' The

"recomputed" when necessary to justify a project that has strong political support. ATLANTIc,
supra note 83, at 56; FnmD & STREAm, Oct. 1970, at 58. Since each Congressman wants his
project approved, even if the cost-benefit ratio is of dubious validity, he will not seriously
challenge questionable projects of others. Liroff, supra note 80, at 30. Another shortcoming
of the cost-benefit ratio as presently applied stems from the inability to express ecological
destruction in monetary terms, thus understating the potential "costs" of a project. See
Krutilla & Cocchetti, Evaluating Benefits of Environmental Resources with Special Application to the Hells Canyon, 12 NATURAL RxsouRcEs J. 1 (1972). Cost-benefit analysis, useful
when dealing with relatively simple "closed" systems, is questionable when used by the Corps
on highly complex "open" systems having substantial ecologic impact. ATmNTc, supra note
83, at 56; see A. MAASS, MUDDY WATmS: THE Aimy ENGINEERS AND THE NATION'S RIVxas
(1951); Muckleston, Water Projects and Recreation Benefits, in CONGRESS AND THE ENVIRONmy (R. Cooley & G. Wandesforde-Smith eds. 1970); Watkins, Crisis on the Eel, in THE
Porrrics oF EcosucmE (L. Roos, Jr. ed. 1971).
86. O-R WATERS AND WmLANDs, supra note 41, at 6.

87. 33 C.F.R. §209.120(d)(5) (1972).
88. Id. §209.130(a)(1).
89. Applicants for dredge and fill permits that may have a "pollution impact" on a
waterway are required to furnish information on the type and quantity of solids to be removed or deposited along with alternate methods of disposal and impact of the alternate
methods of disposal "on the economy of the industry and the environmental effects on the
waterway." Id. §209.130(b)(18)(ii).
90. See text accompanying notes 42-46 supra.

91. 33 C.F.R. §209.150(b)(2) (1972).
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word "commenced," as used in this regulation, was interpreted by district
engineers to mean that no permit was required when the person engaging in
dredging and filling had, prior to May 27, 1970, merely: (1) announced his
plans, or (2) prepared drawings and detailed plans, or (3) obtained state
zoning variances, site plan approval, et cetera, or (4) moved his equipment
to the site, or (5) begun some site preparation. In none of these cases had any
' 92
real dredging and filling work actually "commenced."
Even where dredging and filling had actually started, the loose wording of
the grandfather clause could allow developers to circumvent the regulation's
intent. For example, a large amount of refuse is being dumped into diked
units in San Francisco Bay shoreward of harbor lines. There are no defined
ultimate limits to the site because, when one diked segment becomes filled, an
adjoining area is diked to prepare for additional dumping. The Corps has not
required a permit for the work because the original fill work was commenced
s
prior to May 27, 1970.1
Although the Corps recently broadened its responsibility to the general
public and permit applicants through a more liberal hearing policy,9 4 much
work still escapes public scrutiny. For years district engineers have, without
public notice, issued "letters of permission" for "minor" work done in navigable waters. 5 These letters of permission, amounting to a de facto Corps permit, are given when, in the Corps' opinion, the proposed dredging and filling
will not have a significant impact on environmental values and the project
involves either minor work in unimproved waterways or minor work in areas
96
of improved waterways that are away from navigation routes.
Although letters of permission are ostensibly given only for minor work,
the lack of Corps guidelines for the issuance of such letters has spawned wide
divergence in practices among various district engineers. While some districts
do not issue the letters, other districts issue 400-500 letters of permission annually -- Although this procedure is usually employed for very small projects,
letters of permission have been given for a project to dredge 290,000 cubic
yards and to fill three acres for a marina.98

92.

INCREASING PROTECTION

FOR

OUR WATERS, supra note 2, at 33.

93. Id. at 34.
94. See 33 C.F.R. §209.120(g) (1972).
95. Id. §209.120(d)(7). The regulation states that this procedure may be utilized when,
in the opinion of the district engineer, "there could be no opposition and authorization
[that] would unquestionably be given." Id. The regulation does not state how the district
engineer is able to determine if there is no opposition if no public notice is issued.
96. Id.
97. Hearings on Protecting the Nation's Estuaries: Puget Sound and the Straits of
Georgia and Juan deFuca Before the Subcomm. on Conservation and Natural Resources of
the House Comm. on Government Operations,92d Cong., 2d Sess. 699-700 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Puget Sound Hearings].

98. Id. at 700. The procedures for issuing letters of permission, even for truly "minor"
projects, are legally questionable. The Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, 16 U.S.C. §§661
et seq. (1970), requires the Corps to consult with appropriate federal and state agencies
whenever any waterway is planned or authorized to be diverted, deepened, or otherwise
modified for any purpose whatever under a federal permit. Id. §662. The law, which makes

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss1/2

14

Hoyer: Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Buttressing A Ci
1975]

CORPS OF ENGINEERS DREDGE AND FILL JURISDICTION

The Corps' formal decisionmakling process is also questionable. Materials
0
submitted at a hearing are considered with matters submitted afterward- and
an applicant is advised of all substantive objections and given an opportunity
to reply.100 None of these procedures, however, insure or require that the decision to grant or to deny a permit be based solely on the record.
Although the Corps has gradually increased its jurisdictional ambit and
attendant responsibilities, it still limits the scope of its power in a way that
some view as overly conservative. 10 The Corps still does not take jurisdiction
over waters that, although navigable under modern criteria, do not "form in
their ordinary condition by themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a
continued highway over which commerce is or may be carried on with other
States or foreign countries in the customary modes in which such commerce is
conducted by waters."' 0 2 This regulation has removed many water areas from
Corps scrutiny. For example, Lake Chelan, Washington, 55 miles long and 2
miles wide, was deemed non-navigable because navigation on Lake Chelan
"cannot form a part of either the interstate or international system."' 03
Arguably, such a narrow interpretation of federal power is not mandatory.
There is no constitutional restriction limiting the congressional commerce
power to waterways crossing a state boundary. 04 It should be sufficient if the
waterway in question serves as a link in the commerce chain among the states
05
as it connects with other channels of transportation.
no distinction between "major" and "minor" projects that modify a waterway, requires consultation before the Corps acts on a permit. Although the Corps recently instituted a practice
of giving copies of letters of permission to the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Puget

Sound Hearings,supra note 97, at 697-98, the procedure falls quite short of the requirement
of prior consultation with appropriate state and federal agencies. Furthermore, §21(b) of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §1181(b)(1) (1970), requires an applicant
for a federal permit for construction that might result in a discharge into navigable waters

to provide the Corps with state certification giving reasonable assurance that applicable
water quality standards will not be violated. Some dredging and filling for which letters of

permission are granted result in discharges of material into navigable waterways and thereby
affect water quality standards. And, since this Act does not distinguish between major and
minor projects, Corps letter of permission policy would violate these requirements.
99. Id.
100. Id. §209.120(f)(9).
101. See, e.g., INCREASING PROTECTION FOR OUR WATERS, supra note 2, at 30.
102. 33 C.F.R. §209.260(a) (1972). The wording of the regulation was taken from dictum
in The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870).
103.

INCREASING PROTECTION FOR OUR WATERS, supra note 2, at 30.

104. See, e.g., The Katie, 40 F. 480, 484 (S.D. Ga. 1889). A ship can "ply the waters of a
lake embosomed in the central territory of a state, and be wholly engaged in interstate commerce." Id.
105. Arguably, if goods come from, or go to, another state or serve to aid the flow of

commerce, the part of the transportation that is on the waterway will become part of the
flow, bringing the waterway, by virtue of the commerce dause, within the concept of navigable waters of the United States. Cf. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S.
689 (1948); Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178 (1946); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 US. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). The gist of the federal test is the waterway's use as a highway,
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Moreover, it has been argued that Corps jurisdiction should be sustained
in coastal wetland areas and feeder stream systems that are clearly not navigable.106 The test for determining whether Congress has power to regulate the
use of private property is whether the activity regulated has a substantial effect
on interstate commerce. 10 7 As the Zabel court noted: "[T]he destruction of fish
and wildlife in our estuarine waters does have a substantial, and in some areas
a devastating, effect on interstate commerce."' 08 Dredge and fill work, even
when conducted in remote tributaries, can set off a chain of destruction, culminating in sufficient effects to justify jurisdiction at the federal level.09
The Corps is in need of an aggressive and consistent enforcement policy.
Strong enforcement tools are at its disposal. Illegal dredging and filling is a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine not exceeding 2,500 dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both.11o Moreover, injunctions compelling
removal of all, or part of, any unauthorized structures are statutorily authorized."'

not whether it is part of a navigable interstate commercial avenue. Utah v. United States,
403 U.S. 9, 11 (1971). See also United States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
106. See INCREASING PROTECTION FOR OUR WATERS, supra note 2, at 27. Arguably, the
Corps has the legal justification for assuming jurisdiction over wetland areas adjacent to
navigable waterways that are subject to the ebb and flow of the tide. See note 20 supra.
Such assumption of jurisdiction may be crucial. For example, in early 1971 a determination
that Corps jurisdiction over San Francisco Bay extended only to the part capable of being
used for navigation eliminated from its protective scrutiny about 40% (300 square miles)
of the 800 square miles of Bay lands subject to tidal action. INCREASING PROTECTION FOR OU
WATERS, supra note 2, at 27.
107. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942). The commerce power has been used
to abate pollution. See United States v. Bishop Processing Co., 237 F. Supp. 624 (D. Md.
1968), afJ'd, 423 F.2d 469 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 298 U.S. 904 (1970); Edelman, Federal Air
and Water Control: The Application of the Commerce Power To Abate Interstate and
IntrastatePollution, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1067 (1965).
108. Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 204 (5th Cir. 1970). See S. REP. No. 1981, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1958); Little, New Attitudes About Legal Protection for the Remains of Florida's
Natural Environment, 23 U. FLA. L. REv. 459, 462 (1971): "[A] simple Florida illustration
will suffice. If the owner of tidewater marshlands bulkheads his property, dredges the tidal
body, and fills the flats to build houses, he destroys the spawning grounds of shrimp, fish,
and other creatures of the sea. Consequently, fishermen catch fewer of these creatures,
thereby hurting their trade; fewer anglers are attracted to Florida, thereby damaging the
tourist trade; fewer fish are marketed, thereby reducing the food supply, fewer shore birds
can be supported, thereby diminishing the bird population, and on ad infinitum." See also
B. COMMONER, SCIENCE AND SURVIVAL 26 (1963).
109. See cases cited note 105 supra. For an example of how relatively insignificant the
nexus between the activity sought to be regulated and interstate commerce has become, see
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969). See also United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.,
311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940).
110. 33 U.S.C. §406 (1971).
111. Id. It is the duty of the United States attorneys to prosecute all offenders. 83 U.S.C.
§413 (1971). The injunctive power can be quite potent. See United States v. Moretti, 331
F. Supp. 151 (S.D. Fla. 1971) (defendant ordered to restore bay to original condition and
enjoined from selling land until illegal fill removed). See also United States v. Underwood,
344 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972).
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Notwithstanding this clear legislative prohibition, illegal dredging and
filling continues with prosecutions and remedial actions being applied inconsistently.112 Present Corps procedure in handling violations does little to
encourage compliance; actually the procedure encourages violation. If violators
are caught, they are generally required to apply for an "after-the-fact" permit,11 3 which is usually granted."1 4 Therefore, it is worth the risk not to apply
for a dredge and fill permit, especially if objections would be raised. Even if
caught, a violator can obtain a permit without prejudice from the Corps,
usually by maintaining that his work was innocently done. Illegal activity
therefore actually rewards a developer, since he can commence work without
troubling himself about environmental or public interest criteria while the
law-abiding applicant may have to modify or abandon his construction to
meet the requisite conditions.
Even where violations are identified and an after-the-fact permit is denied,
it is presently Corps policy not to recommend prosecution unless it is dearly
a willful violation." 5 The necessity for scienter has not yet been determined
as to illegal dredging and filling. Nevertheless, it has been held that scienter
is unnecessary for a conviction under the Refuse Act:1 6 because: "The public
is injured just as much by unintentional pollution as it is by deliberate pollu'
7
tion and it would have been entirely reasonable for Congress to attack both.""
Arguably, the same reasoning could apply to "unintentional" dredging and

filling.
Where the Corps does prosecute, the case is not immediately referred to
the appropriate United States attorney, but is first channeled through a
lengthy system of review. 18s As a result, United States attorneys receive reports
of violations months and even years after irreparable harm has taken place. 9

112. Experiences in the Puget Sound are illustrative. As of 1971 it was estimated that
possibly 80% of the works in place in the navigable waters of the Sound were constructed
without a Corps permit. Puget Sound Hearings,supra note 97, at 421. This amounts to an
estimated 50,000 illegal structures and fills. Id. at 710.
113. After-the-fact permits are authorized to be given for work that has already been
commenced or completed. 33 C.F.R. §209.120(c)(1)(iv)(a) (1972). Approval is given if the
work was innocently done and no objection has been received. Id. §209.120(c)(l)(iv)(a)(1). The
applicant is then told to apply before beginning construction in the future. Id. §209.

120(c)(1)(iv)(a) (7).
114. Puget Sound Hearings,supra note 97, at 421.
115. Id. at 263-64.
116. 33 U.S.C. §407 (1971).
117. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354, 356 (M.D. Ind. 1970).
See also The President Coolidge, 101 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1939); United States v. Interlake
Steel Corp., 297 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Ill.
1969); United States v. Bigan, 170 F. Supp. 219 (W.D.
Pa. 1959).
118. Litigation reports and requests for prosecution now go from the district engineers
to the division engineer. Then the requests and reports are forwarded to the Corps' general
counsel in Washington, D.C. After being reviewed by the general counsel they are referred
to the Department of Justice which in turn forwards the file to the appropriate United
States attorney if action is deemed appropriate. INcSEA-nMG PROTECrION FOR OU WATERS,

supra note 2, at 23.
119. The delay not only bodes potential disaster for the area involved, but also works
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PROPOSE) REMEDIES

If the Corps is to retain responsibility for comprehensive water-resource
planning and development, it must slhed the onus of environmental neglect.
The Corps cannot effectively combat widespread dredging and filling with
grudging, piecemeal policy alterations. To fulfill its environmental role while
laying the foundation for rational development, basic changes in Corps policy
and philosophy are needed. Implementation of the following recommendations
would reflect an environmental commitment compatible with present Corps
structure.
(1) The Corps regulations should be amended to require permit applicants
to carry the burden of proving that their proposed work is in accord with the
public interest. Obviously, some dredging and filling might be in the public's
best interst; much of it, however, may result in desecration of valuable coastal
resources. Such a requirement would save time and expense by forcing the
applicants to commit some of their resources to evaluating environmental
impact and alternative projects before receiving a permit. By creating, in effect, a rebuttable presumption that dredging and filling is not in the public's
best interest, only those developers who commit the necessary resources to
planning and evaluating their projects could overcome this protective hurdle.
(2) When the Corps amends regulations to require higher environmental
standards and broader responsibilities, it should cease the practice of tacking
on "grandfather clauses." The actual and potential abuses generated by the
grandfather clause in the harbor line regulation created a major loophole,
frustrating in part the purpose of that regulation. The grandfather clause
should be stricken from the harbor line regulation and should not be employed in the future to dilute progressive revisions.
(3) The Corps of Engineers should provide the public with adequate
notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard concerning all dredge and
fill projects. The present procedure of issuing "letters of permission" for
"minor" work without public notice should be discarded. All projects should
meet the formal requirements for a Corps permit. The public should be
notified of any application being considered. If the costs of a hearing are prohibitive for a minor project, then guidelines should be issued to define what
constitutes a "minor" project and to implement a more abbreviated public
evaluation procedure- possibly receiving written objections from opponents.
Hundreds of "minor" incursions into valuable estuarine breeding grounds can
no longer be dismissed as harmless and approved ex parte.
(4) The Corps should base decisions granting or denying permits solely on
matters of record, incorporating substance brought forth at the hearing. This
would protect applicants and insure that the public interest has been adequately considered. Moreover, the Corps should be required to prepare a brief
statement of its findings and conclusions, describing the conflicting environmental and economic factors, delineating how the public interest weighed in
inestimable harm on innocent buyers who may have invested in residential and business
sites on illegally filled land.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol26/iss1/2

18

19731

Hoyer: Corps of Engineers Dredge and Fill Jurisdiction: Buttressing A Ci

CORPS OF ENGINEERS DREDGE AND FILL JURISDICTION

the equation, and explaining the rationale for its conclusion. Requiring decisions to be based on the record would encourage the Corps to seek recommendations and findings from agencies and individuals with pertinent expertise. Thus, conflicting proposals and opinions, being a part of the record,
would be subject to scrutiny and challenge by the opposing parties. Such a
complete record, accompanied by the Corps' statement of findings and condusions, would relieve reviewing courts from the substantial burden of crystallizing issues and would remove the stigma of arbitrariness.
(5) Recognizing that environmental harm is not localized, but rather
climbs an ecological chain, the Corps should broaden its physical jurisdiction
to encompass more coastal wetland areas. The Corps largely focuses regulatory
attention on projects within the boundaries and neglects much of the adjacent wetlands. As noted previously, such a limitation of its power is not
mandatory. The Corps should also amend its regulations to encompass all
navigable waters and feeder stream systems. Presently the Corps does not assume jurisdiction over waters that, although navigable, do not form by themselves or by uniting with other waters a continued highway over which interstate commerce may be carried. The gist of the federal jurisdiction test, however, is the waterway's use as a highway, not whether it is part of a navigable
20
interstate waterway system.
(6) To complement the expansion of Corps responsibility, an aggressive
and consistent enforcement policy is in order. Present Corps enforcement
policy has, in many districts, proved ineffective and has established undesirable precedents. If the worst penalty a developer can expect for carrying on
unauthorized dredging or filling is an "after-the-fact" permit, the violations
will continue undeterred. Issuance of after-the-fact permits should be authorized only after the illegal work is halted and examined with the same scrutiny
applied to an original application.
Presently, prosecution of violators is not recommended by the Corps unless
it is certain the violator knowingly broke the law. If there is to be a realistic
enforcement policy, however, ignorance of the law should be no excuse. The
Corps' duty is to identify and prosecute violations; any mitigating circumstances can be considered and incorporated by the United States attorney in

120. Recently revised Corps regulations may give rise to this recommended jurisdiction.
After defining navigable waters as those that may be susceptible for use for purposes of
interstate or foreign commerce, 37 Fed. Reg. 18,290 (1972), the regulations considerably
broaden the jurisdictional interpretation of such commerce: "Interstate commerce may of
course be existent on an intrastate voyage which occurs only between places within the
same State. It is only necessary that goods may be brought from, or eventually be destined
to go to, another State." Id. The regulations continue: "A water body may be entirely
within a State, yet still be capable of carrying interstate commerce. This is especially dear
when it physically connects with a generally acknowledged avenue of interstate commerce,
such as the ocean or one of the Great Lakes, and is yet wholly within one State. Nor is it
necessary that there be a physically navigable connection across a State boundary. Where a
waterbody extends through one or more States, but substantial portions, which are capable
of bearing interstate commerce, are located in only one of the States, the entirety of the

waterway up to the head (upper limit) of navigation is subject to Federal jurisdiction." Id,
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his decision to prosecute or by the court in its disposition of the case. Even if
scienter is required for violation of the Rivers and Harbors Act, the determination as to the existence of legal knowledge should not be a Corps function.
The Corps should also streamline procedures used to transfer cases to the
litigation branch of government. The lengthy referral system now employed is
a bureaucratic anachronism. Coordination with the United States attorney's
office should allow referral from the Corps directly to the local United States
attorney.
(7) The Corps should expand the use and scope of the conditional permit.
Although permits with conditions attached are presently authorized and
utilized, the conditions usually deal with problems of navigation, burden for
costs, and liability for damages. 1 21 A policy of granting permits with special
conditions encompassing environmental protection should be adopted. 1 22 The
district engineers could evaluate objections to a project brought forth in public
hearings and independent agency reports, then fashion the objections into
special permit conditions. 123 The economic benefits in proceeding with a
borderline project would not be fatally "balanced out" by the expected
ecological harm. The decision to proceed would then shift to the applicant,
who must weigh the costs and benefits of working under special environmental
constraints. Once such a permit is issued the district engineer would have
authority, as now, to supervise the work to insure compliance with the permit.
If, on final inspection, he determines there is noncompliance with the conditions imposed, he is authorized to make a demand for compliance or, receiving
124
none, resort to criminal or injunctive action.
CONCLUSION

Over the last decade the public has become aware of a view formerly held
only by ardent conservationists: unregulated landscape alteration can bode
disaster. Legislators, after a predictable time lag, have echoed this concern.
Yet, even as the movement toward environmental awareness gathered momentum, no clear ecological mandate arose from the public clamor. The bulk
of the citizenry adopted an environmental ambivalence, speaking with genuine
environmental concern, while demanding new waterfront homes, hotels, and
recreation complexes. Congress underscored this contradiction by enacting laws
to protect fish and wildlife in the same sessions that spawned huge appropriations for water development projects.

121. 33 C.F.R. §209.130(c)(2) (1972).
122. Regulations now mandate a condition to require conformance with federal and
state water pollution regulations, but proof of noncompliance is the responsibility of the
agency possessing water pollution jurisdiction. Id. §209.120(d)(8).
123. The regulations allow special conditions to be imposed if they are regarded as
necessary. Id. §209.130(c)(3)(i). The "exact wording of the recommended conditions" must be
given to the applicant, accompanied by the reasons for the condition, and the applicant has
the opportunity to state his grounds for objection. Id.
124. Id. §209.130(m).
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It seems fitting that within this ambivalent atmosphere the Corps of Engineers, for years the embodiment of the "dredging ethic," should emerge with
primary responsibility for environmental evaluations of dredge and fill projects. Considering the Corps' background, it is not surprising that later improvement came slowly and haphazardly.
While ecological battlelines were being drawn, the Corps stuck to its
inveterate practice of protecting only navigation. The expansion of federal
jurisdiction was no hardship. If the Corps had more areas to regulate, it
necessitated only larger commitments of manpower, not changes in orientation.
Even the mandate of the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act was insufficient
to force an immediate change in Corps policy. Ultimately it was the judiciary
that shoved the Corps, an unlikely and awkward gladiator, into the environmental arena.
But since the Corps was never given, and had never taken, the opportunity
to equip its administrative apparatus with uniform, effective, or appropriate
environmental policies, it had to rely on piecemeal regulatory amendments and
judicial mandates to crystallize its responsibilities. Unfortunately, obeying
divergent judicial opinions and tacking environmental clauses onto navigationoriented regulations results in rather chaotic policy and ironic consequences.
The Corps, carrying its new environmental banner, could be found suing to
enjoin illegal development while, in another court, it was being sued for
damaging the ecology with its own projects.
Whether desirable or not, it seems likely that the Corps of Engineers will
retain jurisdiction over dredge and fill projects. It is clear that the Corps must
give due consideration to the environment in its decisions on permit applications. Balancing ecological and economic interests will unquestionably be
difficult. Moreover, current regulations do not provide clear standards to decide where the public interest lies in this balance. The loose wording of the
regulations coupled with informal and inconsistent procedures promotes
suspicion, breeds unfairness, and forestalls accurate review of Corps determinations.
The Corps must accept its environmental responsibility and revise its
policies and procedures to foster a reasoned balancing of values. This balancing must be done in an open, consistent, and impartial manner geared to
provide procedural fairness to both the developer and the public. Environmentalists are not blind to the demands of a burgeoning, affluent population
for development and construction. Responsible developers, as citizens and
businessmen, do not belittle the value of environmental integrity.
Spotty and inconsistent enforcement policy is not only unfair to both sides,
but it also breeds suspicion, anger, and senseless litigation. Lax enforcement
not only damages the environment, but also penalizes the developer who has
committed his time and resources to make his project environmentally sound.
Such recommendations will not require a drastic overhaul of Corps procedure or funding requirements. They will require a larger commitment of
time. Time to reflect and evaluate. Time to prepare and coordinate more
meaningful records and statements of findings. Time for more surveillance and
consistent enforcement. But certainly the time spent prior to project decisions
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will pay valuable dividends not only in public confidence but also in saving
the waste of post-commencement litigation. The possibility of some delay in
project approval generated by these recommendations may ultimately be the
25
largest asset of these policies:1
The longer we delay meeting our environmental responsibilities, the
longer the growing list of interest charges in environmental deterioration will run. The cost of getting on to a sound basis for the future will
never again be less than it is today.

125.

S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1969).
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